The Polycrisis and Multilateralism

Mark Malloch-Brown: We gather with the 500th day of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine nearing. 

It is an aggression posing far-reaching questions about the future of the continent and of global order. This Annual Council Meeting is a chance to reflect on them. 

Russia’s war is part of a wider global ecosystem of crises feeding into and off each other, sometimes known as the polycrisis. 

It feeds off such pre-existing crises as the rise of impunity; the fracturing of the multilateral order; and nationalist authoritarianism on the march.  

And in turn it feeds further crises like supply chain disruptions; unsustainable debt burdens; disruptive geopolitical shifts; and rising food and energy prices.  

We have seen grain prices rise again this week following the destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam and the devastating effect this is having on Ukrainian farmland. 

Coming on the heels of COVID-19 pandemic the war has contributed to intensification of this polycrisis. 

The statistics tell an alarming story. 

The UNDP’s Human Development Index has fallen for the past two years in a row—the first time in its history that has happened—and back to 2016 levels. 

More than 345 million people face high levels of food insecurity, more than double the number in 2020. 

And some 60 percent of low-income countries are in or near debt distress. 

My own travels over the past months have brought to light a striking contrast.  

To witness the Spring Meetings of the World Bank and the IMF in Washington, and to travel to the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America has been to witness two different worlds.  

In the one, the usual technocratic debates. In the other, a debt crisis playing out right now, with terribly human consequences.  

And everywhere, evidence of Russia’s war in Ukraine accelerating wider changes in the global order. 

One such shift is an emergent, uneven multipolarity.  

On the one hand we have seen the West rally to Ukraine’s cause in a demonstration of America’s enduring power.  

But we are also seeing greater Chinese influence. 

Kyiv does not discount Beijing’s efforts to prepare for future talks and nor should we, as Ukraine’s friends and allies—uncomfortable though it might make us. 

Sands are shifting in the Middle East too, as China’s role in the tentative Iran-Saudi thaw demonstrates. 

And while there is no prospect of overnight de-dollarization, we are seeing the dollar's dominance newly challenged—including by some world leaders who should perhaps know better. 

Then there is the rise of a new non-aligned movement: low- and middle-income countries striking out on a more independent path. 

Not the old Cold War non-alignment but the new non-alignment of the polycrisis era.  

A non-alignment closely intertwined with unsustainable debts, trade and supply chain disruptions, and a simmering resentment at the West for perceived double standards. 

Above all, these are states claiming agency over their own economic survival strategy—by asserting the sovereignty to make their own choices of trade and investment partners, and preserving their independence from commitment to a single bloc in a world divided between China and the West. 

I was asked to speak about the crisis and future of multilateralism in this world of polycrisis. 

While the prospects for root-and-branch reform to multilateralism remain distant, we are seeing probing attempts at reform and innovation at the margins. 

Open Society Foundations is proud to support the Bridgetown Initiative to create new fiscal room for development and green investment—championed by the Prime Minister of Barbados, Mia Mottley.  

The Summit for a New Global Financing Pact in Paris later this month will be a critical moment for this and a chance to look at other transformative but realistic fixes, like a reallocation of so-called Special Drawing Rights.  

Open Society is also backing the case for a permanent African Union seat on the G20—a long-overdue change that begins to redress the structural under-representation of the 21st century’s growth continent. 

Meanwhile, over the past year we have seen moves to challenge the use of the veto by the permanent members of the UN Security Council. 

Often it is smaller countries that are playing an outsized role in spurring change. 

Often, too, it is countries beyond the West that are challenging an order that too often denies them agency. 

And yet Europe can itself—and must—be part of this story. 

For example, European leaders must come together in providing united EU backing for that African Union G20 seat at the upcoming summit of the European Council.  

This continent cannot fall into the trap of assuming that it must choose between confronting Russia’s aggression and confronting the wider polycrisis of which that was is one manifestation. 

It must do both.  

Thank you.